Behavioral Economics
Origens, metodología e ferr amentas de trabalho
Palavras-chave:
Teoria da eleição racional, Behavioral economics, metodologia econômicaResumo
O presente trabalho tem dois objetivos (i) O principal visa propor uma delimitação teórica e metodológica do enfoque da Behavioral economics. Sobre este particular, no trabalho demonstra-se que tal delimitação supõe uma permanente tensão com as hipóteses de comportamento deriváveis do enfoque tradicional de eleição racional. (ii) O objetivo secundário do trabalho se concentra na proposta metodológica apresentada, e para isso, decreve-se um par de casos práticos com a finalidade de explicar e submeter à prova tal proposta; além disso, os casos permitirão desenhar algumas ferramentas de trabalho próprias do enfoque da Behavioral economics.
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Referências
1. ASHRAF, Nava; CAMERER, Colin F. y LOEWENSTEIN, George. Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist. En: Journal of Economic Perspectives. Verano, 2005. vol. 19, no. 3. p. 131–145.
2. BAINBRIDGE, Stephen. Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis. En: University of Cincinnati Law Review. Verano, 2000. vol. 68. p. 1023-1060.
3. BAKER, Lynn y EMERY, Robert. When Every Relationship Is above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage. En: Law and Human Behavior. Agosto, 1993. vol. 17, no. 4. p. 439-450.
4. BERNOULLI, Daniel. Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk. En: Econometrica. Enero, 1954. vol. 22, no. 1. p. 23-36.
5. BUCKLE, Henry. History of civilization in England. New York: Appleton, 1864. Vol. II.
6. CAMERER, Colin. Behavioral economics: Reunifying psychology and economics. En: Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences - PNAS. Septiembre, 1999. vol. 961, no. 19. p. 10575- 10577.
7. CAMERER, Colin F., HO, Teck-Hua y CHONG, Juin-Kuan. A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games. En: The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Agosto, 2004. vol. 119, no. 3. p. 861-898.
8. CAMERER, Colin y LOEWENSTEIN, George. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. En: Advances in Behavioral Economics. New York: Princeton University Press, 2004. p. 3-51.
9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Mobile Device Use While Driving — United States and seven European Countries, 2011. En: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Marzo, 2013. vol. 62, no. 10. p. 177-182.
10. DAWES, Robyn y THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Cooperation. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Verano, 1988. vol. 2, no. 3. p. 187-197.
11. DEERY, Hamis. Hazard and Risk Perception among Young Novice Drivers. En: Journal of Safety Research. Invierno, 1999. vol. 30, no. 4. p. 225–236.
12. ELSTER, Jon. Cuando fracasa la racionalidad. En: Juicios salomónicos: Las limitaciones de la racionalidad como principio de decisión. Traducido por Carlos Gardini. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1991. p. 11-39.
13. ENGEL, Christoph y GIGERENZER, Gerd. Law and heuristics: An interdisciplinary venture. En: Working Paper (MIT Press), 2006. p. 1-16.
14. EUROSTAT. Marriage and divorce statistics. [online] 3 de Junio de 2013. Available from World Wide Web: http://epp.eurostat. ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Marriage_and_ divorce_statistics#Fewer_marriages.2C_more_divorces [cited 11 Sep., 2013]
15. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. Consumer Guide: The Dangers of Texting While Driving. [online] 16 de Enero de 2013. Available from World Wide Web: http:// transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/drivingandtexting.pdf. [cited 20 Sep., 2013]
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17. FRANK, Robert H. Microeconomía y Conducta. Traducido por Esther Rabasco y Luis Toharia. Madrid: McGraw-Hill, 2005.
18. GIGERENZER, Gerd y GOLDSTEIN, Daniel. Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. En: Psychological Review. Octubre, 1996. vol. 103, no. 4. p. 650-669.
19. GIGERENZER, Gerd y TODD, Peter. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.. En: Unedited draft 1999.1-21.
20. HOCH, Stephen y LOEWENSTEIN, George F. Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control. En: Journal of Consumer Research (The University of Chicago Press). Marzo, 1991. vol. 17, no. 4. p. 492-507.
21. HURSH, Steven. Behavioral economics of drug selfadministration and drug abuse policy. En: Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. Septiembre, 1991. vol. 56, no. 2. p. 377–393.
22. HUTCHINSON, John y GIGERENZER, Gerd. Simple heuristics and rules of thumb: where psychologists and behavioural biologists might meet. En: Behavioural processes. 2005. vol. 69, no. 2. p. 97-124.
23. KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Mapas de racionalidad limitada: Psicología para una economía conductual. En: Revista asturiana de economía. 2003. no. 23. p. 181-225.
24. KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Pensar rápido, pensar despacio. Traducido por Joaquín Chamorro. Ebook. Barcelona: Debate, 2012.
25. KAHNEMAN, Daniel, KNETSCH, Jack L. y THALER, Richard H. Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Invierno, 1991. vol. 5, no. 1. p. 193-206.
26. KAHNEMAN, Daniel; KNETSCH, Jack L. y THALER, Richard H. Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. En: The Journal of Political Economy. Diciembre, 1990. vol. 98, no. 6. p. 1325-1348.
27. KAHNEMAN, Daniel y TVERSKY, Amos. Teoría prospectiva: Un análisis de la decisión bajo riesgo. En: Estudios de Psicología: Infancia y Aprendizaje. 1987. no. 30. p. 95-134.
28. KAHNEMAN, Daniel y FREDERICK, Shane. A model of heuristic judgment. En: HOLYOAK, Keith y MORRISON, Robert. The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 267-293.
29. KAHNEMAN, Daniel y FREDERICK, Shane. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. En: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 49-81.
30. KOROBKIN, Russell. The Problems with Heuristics for Law. En: Law & Econ Research Paper No. 4-1. Febrero, 2004. p. 1-18.
31. KYSAR, Douglas. Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution? En: Group Report. Septiembre, 2004. p. 1-26.
32. LOEWENSTEIN, George y THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Otoño, 1989. vol. 3, no. 4. p. 181-193.
33. MAHAR, Heather. Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? En: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business - Discussion Paper No. 436. Septiembre, 2003. p. 1-38.
34. MCCORMICK, Iain; WALKEY, Frank y GREEN, Dianne. Comparative perceptions of driver ability— A confirmation and expansion. En: Accident Analysis & Prevention. Junio, 1986. vol. 18, no. 3. p. 205-208.
35. MULLAINATHAN, Sendhil y THALER, Richard. Behavioral Economics.. En Working Paper MIT, nº 00-27. Septiembre, 2000. p. 1-13.
36. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS. National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends. [online] 19 de Febrero de 2013 Available from World Wide Web. http://www.cdc.gov/ nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm [cited 11 Sep., 2013].
37. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION. Blueprint for Ending Distracted Driving. [online] Junio de 2012. Available from World Wide Web http://www.distraction.gov/ download/campaign-materials/8747-811629-060712-v5-Opt1- Web-tag.pdf [cited 1 Sep., 2013].
38. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION. Driver Distraction in Commercial Vehicle Operations. [online] Septiembre de 2009. Available from World Wide Web http:// www.distraction.gov/research/PDF-Files/Driver-Distraction- Commercial-Vehicle-Operations.pdf [cited 1 Sep., 2013].
39. OJEDA, Norma y GONZÁLEZ, Eduardo. Divorcio y separación conyugal en México en los albores del siglo XXI. En: Revista mexicana de sociología. Enero-Marzo, 2008. vol. 70, no. 1. p. 11-145.
40. RAPHAEL, David D. y MACFIE, Alec L. Introduction. En: SMITH, Adam, editado por RAPHAEL, David D. y MACFIE, Alec L. Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence Vol. 1 The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982. p. 1-46.
41. REYNOLDS, Robert. Search Heuristics of Chess Players of Different Calibers. En: The American Journal of Psychology. Otoño, 1982. vol. 95, no. 3. p. 383-392.
42. SCHELLING, Thomas. The Intimate Contest for Self-Command. En: The Public Interest. 1980. vol. 60. p. 94-118.
43. SCHWARTZ, Hugh. A Introduction to Behavioral Economics: The Complicating but Sometimes Critical Considerations. En: Draft paper, 2007. p. 1-52.
44. SIMON, Herbert. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. En: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (The MIT Press). Febrero, 1955. vol. 69, no. 1. p. 99-118.
45. SIMON, Herbert. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. En: Psychological Review. Marzo, 1956. vol. 63, no. 2. p. 129-138.
46. SIMON, Herbert. Trial and error search in solving difficult problems: Evidence from the game of chess. En: Behavioral Science. 1962. vol. 7, no. 4. p. 425-429.
47. SIMON, Herbert. What is an “explanation” of behavior? En: Psychological Science. Mayo, 1992. vol. 3, no. 3. p. 150-161.
48. SIMON, Herbert, y otros. Decision Making and Problem Solving. En: Interfaces. Octubre, 1987. vol. 17, no. 5. p. 11-31.
49. SIMON, Herbert y CHASE, William. Perception in chess. En: Cognitive Psychology. Enero, 1973. vol. 4, no. 1. p. 55-81.
50. SLOMAN, Steven y LAGNADO, David. The Problem of Induction. En: HOLYOAK, Keith y MORRISON, Robert. The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 95-116.
51. STROTZ, Robert. Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization. En: The Review of Economic Studies. 1956. vol. 23, no. 3. p. 1956.
52. SVENSON, Ola. Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? En: Acta Psychologica. Febrero, 1981. vol. 47, no. 2. p. 143–148.
53. TEICHGRAEBER, Richard. Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem. En: Journal of British Studies (Cambridge University Press). Primavera, 1981. vol. 20, no. 2. p. 106-123.
54. THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Invierno, 1990. vol. 4, no. 1. p. 193- 205.
55. THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Seasonal Movements in Security Prices II: Weekend, Holiday, Turn of the Month, and Intraday Effects. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Otoño, 1987a. vol. 1, no. 2. p. 169-177.
56. THALER, Richard. Anomalies: The January Effect. En: Journal of Economic Perspectives. Verano, 1987b. vol. 1, no. 1. p. 197-201.
57. THALER, Richard H. y SUNSTEIN, Cass R. Un pequeño empujón (Nudge). México D.F.: Taurus, 2009.
58. THALER, Richard. Mortgages Made Simpler. En: The New York Times, Julio, 2009. BU4.
59. THALER, Richard. The Psychology of choice an the assumptions of economics. En: Quasi rational economics. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1994. p. 137-166.
60. THALER, Richard. The Ultimatum Game. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Otoño, 1988. vol. 2, no. 4. p. 195-206.
61. THALER, Richard. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. En: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Marzo, 1980. vol. I, no. 1. p. 39-60.
62. THALER, Richard; SUNSTEIN, Cass y BALZ, John. Choice architecture. En: Working Paper, Abril, 2010. p 1-17.
63. THALER, Richard y SHEFRIN, H. An Economic Theory of Self- Control. En: Journal of Political Economy. Abril, 1981. vol. 89, no. 2. p. 392-406.
64. TISON, J, N Chaudhary y COSGROVE, L. National phone survey on distracted driving attitudes and behaviors. [online] Diciembre de 2011. Available from World Wide Web. http://www.distraction.gov/download/research-pdf/8396_ DistractedDrivingSurvey-120611-v3.pdf [cited 11 Sep., 2013].
65. TOMER, John. What is behavioral economics? En: The Journal of Socio-Economics. Junio, 2007. vol. 36, no. 3. p. 463–479.
66. TVERSKY, Amos y KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. En: Cognitive Psychology. Septiembre, 1973. vol. 5, no. 2. p. 207–232.
67. TVERSKY, Amos y KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. En: Science, New Series. Septiembre, 1974. vol. 185, no. 4157.
68. TVERSKY, Amos y THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Preference Reversals. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Primavera, 1990. vol. 4, no. 2. p. 201- 211.
69. VIRGINIA TECH TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE. New data from Virginia Tech Transportation Institute provides insight into cell phone use and driving distraction. [online] Julio de 2009. Available from World Wide Web. http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/ articles/2009/07/2009-571.html [cited 1 Nov., 2013].
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2. BAINBRIDGE, Stephen. Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis. En: University of Cincinnati Law Review. Verano, 2000. vol. 68. p. 1023-1060.
3. BAKER, Lynn y EMERY, Robert. When Every Relationship Is above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage. En: Law and Human Behavior. Agosto, 1993. vol. 17, no. 4. p. 439-450.
4. BERNOULLI, Daniel. Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk. En: Econometrica. Enero, 1954. vol. 22, no. 1. p. 23-36.
5. BUCKLE, Henry. History of civilization in England. New York: Appleton, 1864. Vol. II.
6. CAMERER, Colin. Behavioral economics: Reunifying psychology and economics. En: Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences - PNAS. Septiembre, 1999. vol. 961, no. 19. p. 10575- 10577.
7. CAMERER, Colin F., HO, Teck-Hua y CHONG, Juin-Kuan. A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games. En: The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Agosto, 2004. vol. 119, no. 3. p. 861-898.
8. CAMERER, Colin y LOEWENSTEIN, George. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. En: Advances in Behavioral Economics. New York: Princeton University Press, 2004. p. 3-51.
9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Mobile Device Use While Driving — United States and seven European Countries, 2011. En: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Marzo, 2013. vol. 62, no. 10. p. 177-182.
10. DAWES, Robyn y THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Cooperation. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Verano, 1988. vol. 2, no. 3. p. 187-197.
11. DEERY, Hamis. Hazard and Risk Perception among Young Novice Drivers. En: Journal of Safety Research. Invierno, 1999. vol. 30, no. 4. p. 225–236.
12. ELSTER, Jon. Cuando fracasa la racionalidad. En: Juicios salomónicos: Las limitaciones de la racionalidad como principio de decisión. Traducido por Carlos Gardini. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1991. p. 11-39.
13. ENGEL, Christoph y GIGERENZER, Gerd. Law and heuristics: An interdisciplinary venture. En: Working Paper (MIT Press), 2006. p. 1-16.
14. EUROSTAT. Marriage and divorce statistics. [online] 3 de Junio de 2013. Available from World Wide Web: http://epp.eurostat. ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Marriage_and_ divorce_statistics#Fewer_marriages.2C_more_divorces [cited 11 Sep., 2013]
15. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. Consumer Guide: The Dangers of Texting While Driving. [online] 16 de Enero de 2013. Available from World Wide Web: http:// transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/drivingandtexting.pdf. [cited 20 Sep., 2013]
16. FESTINGER, Leon. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957.
17. FRANK, Robert H. Microeconomía y Conducta. Traducido por Esther Rabasco y Luis Toharia. Madrid: McGraw-Hill, 2005.
18. GIGERENZER, Gerd y GOLDSTEIN, Daniel. Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. En: Psychological Review. Octubre, 1996. vol. 103, no. 4. p. 650-669.
19. GIGERENZER, Gerd y TODD, Peter. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.. En: Unedited draft 1999.1-21.
20. HOCH, Stephen y LOEWENSTEIN, George F. Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control. En: Journal of Consumer Research (The University of Chicago Press). Marzo, 1991. vol. 17, no. 4. p. 492-507.
21. HURSH, Steven. Behavioral economics of drug selfadministration and drug abuse policy. En: Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. Septiembre, 1991. vol. 56, no. 2. p. 377–393.
22. HUTCHINSON, John y GIGERENZER, Gerd. Simple heuristics and rules of thumb: where psychologists and behavioural biologists might meet. En: Behavioural processes. 2005. vol. 69, no. 2. p. 97-124.
23. KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Mapas de racionalidad limitada: Psicología para una economía conductual. En: Revista asturiana de economía. 2003. no. 23. p. 181-225.
24. KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Pensar rápido, pensar despacio. Traducido por Joaquín Chamorro. Ebook. Barcelona: Debate, 2012.
25. KAHNEMAN, Daniel, KNETSCH, Jack L. y THALER, Richard H. Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Invierno, 1991. vol. 5, no. 1. p. 193-206.
26. KAHNEMAN, Daniel; KNETSCH, Jack L. y THALER, Richard H. Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. En: The Journal of Political Economy. Diciembre, 1990. vol. 98, no. 6. p. 1325-1348.
27. KAHNEMAN, Daniel y TVERSKY, Amos. Teoría prospectiva: Un análisis de la decisión bajo riesgo. En: Estudios de Psicología: Infancia y Aprendizaje. 1987. no. 30. p. 95-134.
28. KAHNEMAN, Daniel y FREDERICK, Shane. A model of heuristic judgment. En: HOLYOAK, Keith y MORRISON, Robert. The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 267-293.
29. KAHNEMAN, Daniel y FREDERICK, Shane. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. En: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 49-81.
30. KOROBKIN, Russell. The Problems with Heuristics for Law. En: Law & Econ Research Paper No. 4-1. Febrero, 2004. p. 1-18.
31. KYSAR, Douglas. Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution? En: Group Report. Septiembre, 2004. p. 1-26.
32. LOEWENSTEIN, George y THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Otoño, 1989. vol. 3, no. 4. p. 181-193.
33. MAHAR, Heather. Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? En: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business - Discussion Paper No. 436. Septiembre, 2003. p. 1-38.
34. MCCORMICK, Iain; WALKEY, Frank y GREEN, Dianne. Comparative perceptions of driver ability— A confirmation and expansion. En: Accident Analysis & Prevention. Junio, 1986. vol. 18, no. 3. p. 205-208.
35. MULLAINATHAN, Sendhil y THALER, Richard. Behavioral Economics.. En Working Paper MIT, nº 00-27. Septiembre, 2000. p. 1-13.
36. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS. National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends. [online] 19 de Febrero de 2013 Available from World Wide Web. http://www.cdc.gov/ nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm [cited 11 Sep., 2013].
37. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION. Blueprint for Ending Distracted Driving. [online] Junio de 2012. Available from World Wide Web http://www.distraction.gov/ download/campaign-materials/8747-811629-060712-v5-Opt1- Web-tag.pdf [cited 1 Sep., 2013].
38. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION. Driver Distraction in Commercial Vehicle Operations. [online] Septiembre de 2009. Available from World Wide Web http:// www.distraction.gov/research/PDF-Files/Driver-Distraction- Commercial-Vehicle-Operations.pdf [cited 1 Sep., 2013].
39. OJEDA, Norma y GONZÁLEZ, Eduardo. Divorcio y separación conyugal en México en los albores del siglo XXI. En: Revista mexicana de sociología. Enero-Marzo, 2008. vol. 70, no. 1. p. 11-145.
40. RAPHAEL, David D. y MACFIE, Alec L. Introduction. En: SMITH, Adam, editado por RAPHAEL, David D. y MACFIE, Alec L. Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence Vol. 1 The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982. p. 1-46.
41. REYNOLDS, Robert. Search Heuristics of Chess Players of Different Calibers. En: The American Journal of Psychology. Otoño, 1982. vol. 95, no. 3. p. 383-392.
42. SCHELLING, Thomas. The Intimate Contest for Self-Command. En: The Public Interest. 1980. vol. 60. p. 94-118.
43. SCHWARTZ, Hugh. A Introduction to Behavioral Economics: The Complicating but Sometimes Critical Considerations. En: Draft paper, 2007. p. 1-52.
44. SIMON, Herbert. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. En: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (The MIT Press). Febrero, 1955. vol. 69, no. 1. p. 99-118.
45. SIMON, Herbert. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. En: Psychological Review. Marzo, 1956. vol. 63, no. 2. p. 129-138.
46. SIMON, Herbert. Trial and error search in solving difficult problems: Evidence from the game of chess. En: Behavioral Science. 1962. vol. 7, no. 4. p. 425-429.
47. SIMON, Herbert. What is an “explanation” of behavior? En: Psychological Science. Mayo, 1992. vol. 3, no. 3. p. 150-161.
48. SIMON, Herbert, y otros. Decision Making and Problem Solving. En: Interfaces. Octubre, 1987. vol. 17, no. 5. p. 11-31.
49. SIMON, Herbert y CHASE, William. Perception in chess. En: Cognitive Psychology. Enero, 1973. vol. 4, no. 1. p. 55-81.
50. SLOMAN, Steven y LAGNADO, David. The Problem of Induction. En: HOLYOAK, Keith y MORRISON, Robert. The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 95-116.
51. STROTZ, Robert. Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization. En: The Review of Economic Studies. 1956. vol. 23, no. 3. p. 1956.
52. SVENSON, Ola. Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? En: Acta Psychologica. Febrero, 1981. vol. 47, no. 2. p. 143–148.
53. TEICHGRAEBER, Richard. Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem. En: Journal of British Studies (Cambridge University Press). Primavera, 1981. vol. 20, no. 2. p. 106-123.
54. THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Invierno, 1990. vol. 4, no. 1. p. 193- 205.
55. THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Seasonal Movements in Security Prices II: Weekend, Holiday, Turn of the Month, and Intraday Effects. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Otoño, 1987a. vol. 1, no. 2. p. 169-177.
56. THALER, Richard. Anomalies: The January Effect. En: Journal of Economic Perspectives. Verano, 1987b. vol. 1, no. 1. p. 197-201.
57. THALER, Richard H. y SUNSTEIN, Cass R. Un pequeño empujón (Nudge). México D.F.: Taurus, 2009.
58. THALER, Richard. Mortgages Made Simpler. En: The New York Times, Julio, 2009. BU4.
59. THALER, Richard. The Psychology of choice an the assumptions of economics. En: Quasi rational economics. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1994. p. 137-166.
60. THALER, Richard. The Ultimatum Game. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Otoño, 1988. vol. 2, no. 4. p. 195-206.
61. THALER, Richard. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. En: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Marzo, 1980. vol. I, no. 1. p. 39-60.
62. THALER, Richard; SUNSTEIN, Cass y BALZ, John. Choice architecture. En: Working Paper, Abril, 2010. p 1-17.
63. THALER, Richard y SHEFRIN, H. An Economic Theory of Self- Control. En: Journal of Political Economy. Abril, 1981. vol. 89, no. 2. p. 392-406.
64. TISON, J, N Chaudhary y COSGROVE, L. National phone survey on distracted driving attitudes and behaviors. [online] Diciembre de 2011. Available from World Wide Web. http://www.distraction.gov/download/research-pdf/8396_ DistractedDrivingSurvey-120611-v3.pdf [cited 11 Sep., 2013].
65. TOMER, John. What is behavioral economics? En: The Journal of Socio-Economics. Junio, 2007. vol. 36, no. 3. p. 463–479.
66. TVERSKY, Amos y KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. En: Cognitive Psychology. Septiembre, 1973. vol. 5, no. 2. p. 207–232.
67. TVERSKY, Amos y KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. En: Science, New Series. Septiembre, 1974. vol. 185, no. 4157.
68. TVERSKY, Amos y THALER, Richard. Anomalies: Preference Reversals. En: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association). Primavera, 1990. vol. 4, no. 2. p. 201- 211.
69. VIRGINIA TECH TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE. New data from Virginia Tech Transportation Institute provides insight into cell phone use and driving distraction. [online] Julio de 2009. Available from World Wide Web. http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/ articles/2009/07/2009-571.html [cited 1 Nov., 2013].
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2017-06-30
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Behavioral Economics: Origens, metodología e ferr amentas de trabalho. (2017). Entramado, 10(2), 184-206. https://revistas.unilibre.edu.co/index.php/entramado/article/view/3504
