Behavioral Economics
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Palabras clave

Teoría de la elección racional
Behavioral Economics
metodología económica

Cómo citar

Monroy Cely, D. (2017). Behavioral Economics. Entramado, 10(2), 184-206. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.unilibre.edu.co/index.php/entramado/article/view/3504

Resumen

El presente trabajo tiene dos objetivos (i) El principal se dirige a proponer una delimitación teórica y metodológica del enfoque del Behavioral Economics. Sobre este particular, en el trabajo se demuestra que tal delimitación supone una permanente tensión con las hipótesis de comportamiento derivables del enfoque tradicional de elección racional. (ii) El objetivo secundario del trabajo se concentra en la propuesta metodológica presentada, y para ello, se describen un par de casos prácticos con el fin de explicar y someter a prueba tal propuesta; además los casos permitirán perfilar algunas herramientas de trabajo propias del enfoque del Behavioral Economics

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Citas

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