Methodology to design mechanisms in the colombian social security
Keywords:
theory of games, ideal of pareto, function of utility, theory of the signatureAbstract
With the utilization of the Theory of Games and its applications to Designing Mechanisms problems, it has been proposed a methodology to measure the incentives of the agents at the labour market, to realize the contributions of social security and parafiscals, as due . A guide of analysis that by means of incorporated restrictions of incompatibility and incentives and participation has been proposed, allowing this way to evaluate the scheme of incentives of a representative agent and its impact to the contribution to social security and parafiscals.
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References
bernal, r. y cárdenas, m. (2003). Determinants of labour Demand in colombia. nber, Working Paper, 10077.
bernal, r. (2007). "the informal market in Colombia: identification and characterization". en: Working Paper. Bogotá. Universidad de los Andes.
Cárdenas, M. y Mejía, C. (2007). "La informalidad en colombia: nueva evidencia". en: Working Paper. n° 35. bogotá. Fedesarrollo.
Gibbons, r. (2003). un Primer curso en Teoría de Juegos. antoni bosh.
laffont, j. and maskin, e. (1982). advances in economic Theory. cambridge university Press.
santamaría, m. y rozo j. (2008). "informalidad empresarial en colombia: alternativas para impulsar la productividad, el empleo y los ingresos". en: Working Paper. n° 40. bogotá. Fedesarrollo.
myerson, m. (2006). Perspectives on mechanism Design in economic Theory. lecture nobel.
maskin, e. (2006). mechanism Design: How To implement social goals. lecture nobel.
serrano, r. (2003) the theory of implementation of social choice rules. Working Paper, brown university.
jackson, m. (2001). "a crash course in implementation theory". en: Working Paper. university of california.
Garg, G. et al. (2008). "mechanism design for single leader stackelberg Problems and application to Procurement auction design". en: Transactions on automation science and engineering. Vol. 5. n° 3.
jackson, m. (2000). "mechanism design theory". en: Working Paper. university of california.
bernal, r. (2007). "the informal market in Colombia: identification and characterization". en: Working Paper. Bogotá. Universidad de los Andes.
Cárdenas, M. y Mejía, C. (2007). "La informalidad en colombia: nueva evidencia". en: Working Paper. n° 35. bogotá. Fedesarrollo.
Gibbons, r. (2003). un Primer curso en Teoría de Juegos. antoni bosh.
laffont, j. and maskin, e. (1982). advances in economic Theory. cambridge university Press.
santamaría, m. y rozo j. (2008). "informalidad empresarial en colombia: alternativas para impulsar la productividad, el empleo y los ingresos". en: Working Paper. n° 40. bogotá. Fedesarrollo.
myerson, m. (2006). Perspectives on mechanism Design in economic Theory. lecture nobel.
maskin, e. (2006). mechanism Design: How To implement social goals. lecture nobel.
serrano, r. (2003) the theory of implementation of social choice rules. Working Paper, brown university.
jackson, m. (2001). "a crash course in implementation theory". en: Working Paper. university of california.
Garg, G. et al. (2008). "mechanism design for single leader stackelberg Problems and application to Procurement auction design". en: Transactions on automation science and engineering. Vol. 5. n° 3.
jackson, m. (2000). "mechanism design theory". en: Working Paper. university of california.
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Published
2018-02-19
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