Legal tradition and quality of institutions: is colonization by french law countries distinctive?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18041/1900-0642/criteriolibre.2013v11n18.1118Keywords:
Legal traditions, development, colonizationAbstract
Recent literature argues that legal traditions of nations, i.e. their belonging to the world of common law or civil law, are not neutral in terms of economic or institutional performance, especially with regard to key opportunities in developing countries out of poverty. We present the results of an exploratory exploitation of the “institutional profiles database” provided by DGTPE (French Ministry of Economy and Finance) and French Development Agency (survey 2009) supplemented by data on legal origin and other variables from La Porta et al. We highlight specificities of developing countries having inherited the French law (relative to those of English law). A reflection on political power and the state finds a strong contrast between the ideal-typical model of French law and the empirical findings. This contrast is consistent with the notion rather than real state in the former French colonies.
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References
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Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Robinson, J.A. (2004). Institutions af the fundamental cause of long-run growth. in P. Aghion & S. Durlauf. Handbook of economic growth.
Barro, R. (2000). Rule of law, democracy, and economic performance. In 2000 index of economic freedom. Heritage Foundation.
Bertocchi, G.; Canova, F. (1996). Did colonization matter for growth? an empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa’s underdevelopment. CEPR, London, UK: unpublished working paper.
Botero J., S.; Djankov, R.; La Porta, F.; López-deSilanes, A. Shleifer (2004). The regulation of labor. Quarterly Journal of economics, 119 (4).
Bromley, D. (2008). The Economic Reach of the African State: Notional Governance and the Mask of Citizenship. Working paper. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Dpt. of Agriculture & Applied Economics.
Clague C., P. Keefer, S.; Knack, M. Olson (1999). Contract-Intensive money: contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance. Journal of economic growth, 4 (2).
Clark, J.M. (1926). Social control of Business, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (4th edition, 1930).
Commons, J.R. (1924). legal foundations of capitalism. New York: Macmillan.
Coquery-Vidrovitch, C.; Moniot, H. (1984). l’afrique noire de 1800 à nos jours, Paris, PUF, Coll. Nouvelles Clio.
Cross, F.B. (2002). Law and Economic Growth. texas law review, 80 (7).
De Soto, H. (2005). le mystère du capital, French traduction, Paris: Flammarion.
Djankov S., R.; La Porta, F.; López-de-Silanes, A.; Shleifer (2003). Courts. Quarterly Journal of economics, 118 (3).
Djankov S., R.; La Porta, F.; López-de-Silanes, A.; Shleifer (2003). The new comparative economics. Journal of comparative economics, 31.
Glaeser, E.L.; A. Shleifer (2002). Legal origins. Quarterly Journal of economics, nov.
Greif, A. (2006). institutions and the Path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hayo, B.; Voigt, S. (2010). Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government? Journal of comparative economics, 38.
Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, M. Mastruzzi (2003). governance matters iii: gouvernance indicators for 1996-2002. World Bank.
Klerman D., Mahoney P., Spamann H., Weinstein M, (2010). Legal origin or colonial history. Unpublished working paper.
La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R. (1999). The Quality of Government. Journal of law, economics and Organization, 15 (1).
La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F.; PopEleches, C.; Shleifer, A. (2004). Judicial Checks and Balance. Journal of Political economy, 112 (2).
Levine R. (1999). Law, Finance, and Economic Growth. Journal of financial intermediation, 8.
López-de-Silanes, F.; La Porta, R.; Shleifer, A.; Glaeser, E. (2004). Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of economic growth, 9.
Mahoney, P. G. (2001). The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right. Journal of legal Studies, 30 (2).
M’Bokolo, E. (1985). Histoire de l’afrique. Paris: Le Seuil, coll. Points.
Meisel N., Ould Aoudia J. (2007). La ‘Bonne gouvernance’ est-elle une Bonne Stratégie de Développement? Documents de travail de la DgtPe. Paris: Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances. Cahiers, n° 2007/11, November.
Milhat C. (2004). L’Etat constitutionnel en Afrique francophone: entre Etat de droit et «état de droit». colloque Développement durable. leçons et perspectives, Ouagadougou, 1er4 juin, actes disponibles sur le site: www. francophonie-durable.org.
Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances du Royaume du Maroc, Direction des Etudes et des Prévisions financières (1998). croissance, emploi et protection sociale. Document de travail n° 32, juillet.
North D. (1990). institutions, institutional change, and economic Performance, Cambridge (Mass.): Cambridge University Press.
North, D.; Wallis, J.J.; Weingast, B.R. (2006). A Conceptual Framework For Interpreting Recorded Human History. nBer Working Papers Series. Working Paper 12795, December.
North, D.; Wallis, J.J.; Weingast, B.R. (2010). violence et ordres sociaux. French traduction, Paris: NRF, Bibliothèque des sciences humaines, Gallimard.
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Published
2017-11-08
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Artículos
How to Cite
KIRAT, T. (2017). Legal tradition and quality of institutions: is colonization by french law countries distinctive?. Criterio Libre, 11(18), 25-54. https://doi.org/10.18041/1900-0642/criteriolibre.2013v11n18.1118
