Palabras clave
Gobierno Corporativo
empresa familiar
códigos de gobierno corporativo
asamblea general de accionistas
junta directiva
comité de nominación
comité de remuneración
comité de auditoría
miembros de junta directiva Corporate governances
family business
codes of corporate governance
shareholders’ meeting
board of directors
nomination committee
remuneration committee
audit committee
board’s committees
board of directors members Governança corporativa
empresa familiar
códigos de governo corporativo
assembleia geral de acionistas
conselho diretivo
comissão de nominação
comissão de remuneração
comissão de auditoria
membros de conselho diretivo
empresa familiar
códigos de gobierno corporativo
asamblea general de accionistas
junta directiva
comité de nominación
comité de remuneración
comité de auditoría
miembros de junta directiva Corporate governances
family business
codes of corporate governance
shareholders’ meeting
board of directors
nomination committee
remuneration committee
audit committee
board’s committees
board of directors members Governança corporativa
empresa familiar
códigos de governo corporativo
assembleia geral de acionistas
conselho diretivo
comissão de nominação
comissão de remuneração
comissão de auditoria
membros de conselho diretivo
Cómo citar
Gómez Betancourt, G., & Zapata Cuervo, N. (2017). Gobierno Corporativo: Una comparación de códigos de gobierno en el mundo, un modelo para empresas latinoaméricanas familiares y no familiares. Entramado, 9(2), 98–117. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.unilibre.edu.co/index.php/entramado/article/view/3466
Resumen
Con el fin de proponer un modelo de gobierno corporativo para empresas latinoamericanas familiares y no familiares, se estudió y analizó códigos de gobierno corporativo de catorce países, encontrandó que solo dos hacen referencia a empresas familiares: Brasil y Colombia. La mayoría de códigos están dirigidos a empresas que cotizan en la bolsa, dejando a un lado las empresas familiares, pequeñas, medianas y grandes empresas, que hacen una gran contribución en la economía de un país. Se encontró una gran diferencia entre los códigos de gobierno según la estructura empresarial del país: i) hay países donde los dueños delegan la mayoría de sus responsabilidades a la Junta Directiva, como Estados Unidos, Australia y Reino Unido; ii) países donde los dueños se involucran fuertemente en el gobierno corporativo, como Japón y México; y iii) países que tienen un nivel medio de delegación. Estos últimos dividos así: a) países que no delegan las responsabilidades de los dueños como la auditoría y nominación de los miembros de junta, por ejemplo, Noruega y Alemania; y b) países donde se delega a la Junta Directiva, la auditoria y/o nominación de miembros de junta. Se hace una propuesta académica para con el fin de encontrar el equilibrio de poderes basado en la cultura y tradición en la ley civil latinoamericana donde los dueños tienen responsabilidades no delegables como la auditoría y nominación de miembros de junta.
Citas
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28. GÓMEZ-BETANCOURT, Gonzalo. Son iguales todas las empresas familiares?: Caminos por recorrer. Grupo Editorial Norma, 2005. 8475774075.
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30. HALLOCK, Kevin. Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Vol. 32, No. 3 (1997); p. 331-344.
31. HERMALIN, Benjamin y WEISBACH, Michael. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. In: Financial management. Vol. 20, No. 4 (1991); p. 101-112.
32. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA. Code of Best Practices of Corporate Governance. 4th ed. Sao Pablo 2010.
33. KLEIN, April. Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure. In: The Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 41, No. 1(1998); p. 275-304.
34. LANDER, Guy. What is Sarbanes Oxley? New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2004. 114 p. 0-07-143796-7.
35. LEAL, Ricardo. The emergence of a serious contender: corporate governance in Brazil. In: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011, p. 317-329.
36. LINCK, James S., NETTER, Jeffry M. y YANG, Tina. The effects and unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the supply and demand for directors. In: Review of Financial Studies. Vol. 22, No. 8(2009); p. 3287-3328.
37. LITVAK, Kate. The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on non- US companies cross-listed in the US. In: Journal of corporate Finance. Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007); p. 195-228.
38. MALLIN, Christine. Corporate governance developments in the UK. En: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011, p. 3 - 13.
39. MENON, K. y DEAHL Williams, J. The use of audit committees for monitoring. In: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. Vol. 13, No. 2 (1994); p. 121-139.
40. MURPHY, Kevin y JENSEN, Michael. Performance pay and top management incentives. In: The Journal of Political Economy. Vol.98, No. 2(1990)
41. NEWMAN, Harry y MOZES, Haim. Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practices? In: Financial Management. Vol. 28, No. 3 (1999); p. 41-53.
42. NORWEGIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BOARD. The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance. Norway: (7th Edition, 2012), p. 61.
43. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. “White Paper” sobre Gobierno Corporativo en America Latina. 2004.
44. RASMUSSEN, Janicke L. y HUSE, Morten. Corporate governance in Norway: women and employee-elected board members. En: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Second ed. UK: Edward Leonard Publishing Limited 2011.
45. ROSENSTEIN, Stuart y WYATT, Jeffrey. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. In: Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 26, No. 2 (1990); p. 175-191.
46. SECURITIES MARKET ASSOCIATION. Finnish Corporate Governance Code. Finland2010. 978-952-5620-47-4.
47. SHAFFER, GREGORY Y POLLACK, MARK. Hard vs. soft law: alternatives, complements and antagonists in international governance. In: Minnesota Law Review. Vol. 94, (2010);p. 706- 99.
48. SHIVDASANI, Anil. Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. In: Journal of accounting and economics. Vol. 16, No. 1(1993); p. 167-198.
49. SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BOARD. Swedish Corporate Governance Code. Stockholm: Hallvarson & Hallvarson, 2010.
50. TAM, Kit y YU, Celina. China’s corporate governance development. En: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Second ed. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011.
51. THE LEBANESE TRANSPARENCY ASSOCIATION. Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed companies. Lebanon 2010.
52. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INC. Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies. Tokyo 2009. 12 p.
53. UZUN, Hatice, SZEWCZYK, Samuel H y VARMA, Raj. Board composition and corporate fraud In: Financial Analysts Journal. Vol. 60, No. 3(2004);p. 33-43.
54. WERDER, Axel V. y TALAULICAR, Till. Corporate governance in Germany: basic characteristics, recent developments and future perspectives. In: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (2011); p. 36- 58.
55. WINTOKI, Babajide. Corporate boards and regulation: The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the exchange listing requirements on firm value. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. Vol. 13, No. 2, (2007); p. 229-250.
56. ZAHRA, Shaker A. y PEARCE II, John A. Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: a Review and Integrative Model. In: Journal of Management. (1989);p. 291 - 334.
57. ZHANG, Yan, ZHOU, Jian y ZHOU, Nan. Audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. In: Journal of accounting and public policy. Vol. 26, No. 3(2007);p. 300-327.
2. AHMADJIAN, Christina L. y OKUMURA, Ariyoshi. Corporate governance in Japan. In: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Second ed. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011, p. 247 - 223.
3. ANDERSON, Ronald y BIZJAK, John. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. In: Journal of Banking & Finance. Vol. 27, No. 7(2003); p. 1323-1348.
4. ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL. Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. 2nd Edition ed2007. 1 875262 42 3.
5. BAKER, George P., JENSEN, Michael y MURPHY, Kevin. Compensation and incentives: practices vs theory. In: The journal of Finance. Vol. 43, No. 3 (1988); p. 593-616.
6. BAYSINGER, Barry y BUTLER, Henry. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. In: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. Vol.1, No. 1(1985); p. 101-124.
7. BEBCHUK, Lucian Arye. y FRIED, Jesse. Executive compensation as an agency problem. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 17, No. 3 (2003); p. 71-92.
8. BEBCHUK, Lucian Arye y FRIED, Jesse. M. Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004.
9. BOYD, Brian. Board control and CEO compensation In: Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 15, No. 5 (1994); p. 335-344.
10. BRICKLEY, James, COLES, Jeffrey y JARRELL, Gregg. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board. In: Journal of corporate Finance. Vol. 3 No. 3 (. 1997); p. 189-220.
11. BRUCE, Alistair, BUCK, Trevor y GM MAIN, Brian. Top executive remuneration: A view from Europe. In: Journal of Management Studies. Vol. 42, No. 7 (2005); p. 1493-1506.
12. CADBURY, Adrian. Board Focus. The Governance Debate. Cadbury Report. 1992.
13. CADBURY, Adrian. Report of the Committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. London: Gee Publishing, 1992.
14. CAMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, CONFECAMARAS Y SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES. Guía Colombiana de Gobierno Corporativo para Sociedades Cerradas y de Familia. Bogotá 2009. 101 p. 978-958-688-283-5.
15. COATES, John. The goals and promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In: The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 21, No. 1 (2007); p. 91-116.
16. COMISIÓN ESPECIAL PARA EL FOMENTO DE LA TRANSPARENCIA Y SEGURIDAD EN LOS MERCADOS Y EN LAS SOCIEDADES COTIZADAS. Informe de la comisión especial para el fomento de la transparencia y seguridad en los mercados y en las sociedades cotizadas. Informe Aldama. España2003.
17. COMMITTEE FOR THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES. Report Code of Conduct (The Preda Code). Italy: 1999), p. 70.
18. CONSEJO COORDINADOR EMPRESARIAL. Código de Mejores Prácticas Corporativas. México, 2010. 35.
19. CONYON, Martin J. Compensation committees and CEO pay. En: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Second ed. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011.
20. CONYON, Martin y HE, Lerong. Compensation committees and CEO compensation incentives in US entrepreneurial firms. In: Journal of Management Accounting Research. Vol. 16, No. 1 (2004); p. 35-56.
21. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE. The 2009 Belgian Code on Corporate Governance. Brussels2009. 40 p.
22. DALTON, Dan y KESNER, Idalene. Composition and CEO duality in boards of directors: An international perspective. In: Journal of International Business Studies. Vol. 18, No. 3 (1987); p. 33-42.
23. DAILY, Catherine, JOHNSON, Jonathan, ELLSTRAND, Alan y DALTON, Dan. Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation. In: Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 41, No. 2 (1998); p. 209-220.
24. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL. The UK Corporate Governance Code. London2012.
25. FINLAND CENTRAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. Improving Corporate Governance of Unlisted Companies. Helsinki2006.
26. GÓMEZ-ANSÓN, Silvia y CABEZA-GARCÍA, Laura. Recent corporate governance developments in Spain. In: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011, p. 14 -36.
27. GÓMEZ-BETANCOURT, Gonzalo. ¿Cómo construir un legado familiar? un modelo para tener familias empresarias perdurables. México: Cengage Learning, 2010.
28. GÓMEZ-BETANCOURT, Gonzalo. Son iguales todas las empresas familiares?: Caminos por recorrer. Grupo Editorial Norma, 2005. 8475774075.
29. GOVERNMENT COMMISSION. German Corporate Governance Code. German Corporate Governance Code. Germany: 2012, p. 16.
30. HALLOCK, Kevin. Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Vol. 32, No. 3 (1997); p. 331-344.
31. HERMALIN, Benjamin y WEISBACH, Michael. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. In: Financial management. Vol. 20, No. 4 (1991); p. 101-112.
32. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA. Code of Best Practices of Corporate Governance. 4th ed. Sao Pablo 2010.
33. KLEIN, April. Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure. In: The Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 41, No. 1(1998); p. 275-304.
34. LANDER, Guy. What is Sarbanes Oxley? New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2004. 114 p. 0-07-143796-7.
35. LEAL, Ricardo. The emergence of a serious contender: corporate governance in Brazil. In: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011, p. 317-329.
36. LINCK, James S., NETTER, Jeffry M. y YANG, Tina. The effects and unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the supply and demand for directors. In: Review of Financial Studies. Vol. 22, No. 8(2009); p. 3287-3328.
37. LITVAK, Kate. The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on non- US companies cross-listed in the US. In: Journal of corporate Finance. Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007); p. 195-228.
38. MALLIN, Christine. Corporate governance developments in the UK. En: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011, p. 3 - 13.
39. MENON, K. y DEAHL Williams, J. The use of audit committees for monitoring. In: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. Vol. 13, No. 2 (1994); p. 121-139.
40. MURPHY, Kevin y JENSEN, Michael. Performance pay and top management incentives. In: The Journal of Political Economy. Vol.98, No. 2(1990)
41. NEWMAN, Harry y MOZES, Haim. Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practices? In: Financial Management. Vol. 28, No. 3 (1999); p. 41-53.
42. NORWEGIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BOARD. The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance. Norway: (7th Edition, 2012), p. 61.
43. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. “White Paper” sobre Gobierno Corporativo en America Latina. 2004.
44. RASMUSSEN, Janicke L. y HUSE, Morten. Corporate governance in Norway: women and employee-elected board members. En: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Second ed. UK: Edward Leonard Publishing Limited 2011.
45. ROSENSTEIN, Stuart y WYATT, Jeffrey. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. In: Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 26, No. 2 (1990); p. 175-191.
46. SECURITIES MARKET ASSOCIATION. Finnish Corporate Governance Code. Finland2010. 978-952-5620-47-4.
47. SHAFFER, GREGORY Y POLLACK, MARK. Hard vs. soft law: alternatives, complements and antagonists in international governance. In: Minnesota Law Review. Vol. 94, (2010);p. 706- 99.
48. SHIVDASANI, Anil. Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. In: Journal of accounting and economics. Vol. 16, No. 1(1993); p. 167-198.
49. SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BOARD. Swedish Corporate Governance Code. Stockholm: Hallvarson & Hallvarson, 2010.
50. TAM, Kit y YU, Celina. China’s corporate governance development. En: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. Second ed. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011.
51. THE LEBANESE TRANSPARENCY ASSOCIATION. Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed companies. Lebanon 2010.
52. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INC. Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies. Tokyo 2009. 12 p.
53. UZUN, Hatice, SZEWCZYK, Samuel H y VARMA, Raj. Board composition and corporate fraud In: Financial Analysts Journal. Vol. 60, No. 3(2004);p. 33-43.
54. WERDER, Axel V. y TALAULICAR, Till. Corporate governance in Germany: basic characteristics, recent developments and future perspectives. In: Handbook on International Corporate Governance. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (2011); p. 36- 58.
55. WINTOKI, Babajide. Corporate boards and regulation: The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the exchange listing requirements on firm value. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. Vol. 13, No. 2, (2007); p. 229-250.
56. ZAHRA, Shaker A. y PEARCE II, John A. Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: a Review and Integrative Model. In: Journal of Management. (1989);p. 291 - 334.
57. ZHANG, Yan, ZHOU, Jian y ZHOU, Nan. Audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. In: Journal of accounting and public policy. Vol. 26, No. 3(2007);p. 300-327.
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