Aristotle´'s rejection of logiacal fatalism in book IX of De Interpretatione
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18041/1692-5726/sin_fundamento.26.2020.13584Keywords:
Aristotle, logic, logical fatalism, determinism, naval battleAbstract
The article reconstructs the arguments of Book IX of De interpretatione by Aristotle, showing how the philosopher presents the fatalist argument—based on the logical principles of Bivalence, the Law of the Excluded Middle, and the Principle of Non— Contradiction—only to later refute this version of logical fatalism. The key to Aristotle’s counterargument lies in limiting the validity of the Principle of Bivalence for propositions about the future, that is, denying that future propositions have a determined truth value. This entails questioning the omnitemporality of truth and preserves contingency, deliberation, and human freedom.
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References
Ackrill, J.L. (1993). “Notas: De interpretatione.” En J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981) Aristotle and the sea Battle, en From Parmenides to
Wittgenstein (The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume 1., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Aristóteles. (1995). De interpretatione (trad. Miguel Candel Sanmartín), en Tratados de lógica (Órganon). Madrid: Gredos.
Gaskin, R. (1995). The sea battle and the master argument. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Istvan. (2014). Is Aristotle’s Response to the argument for Fatalism in De interpretatione 9 succesful?, en Ideas y Valores.
Vuillemin, J. (1996). Necessity or contingency, cap 6. Stanford: California.
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- 14-03-2020 (2)
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