Tamaño e independencia de la junta, su relación con el valor de la empresa
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18041/1657-2815/libreempresa.2019v16n1.5903Palabras clave:
Gobierno corporativo, tamaño de la junta directiva, independencia de la junta directiva, valor de la empresaResumen
Este trabajo analizó el efecto del tamaño y la independencia de la junta directiva en el valor de empresa (medido a través de la Q de Tobin) en empresas listadas en la Bolsa de Valores de Colombia durante el período 2001-2013. La muestra comprendió un panel de datos no balanceado con 406 observaciones-año. El análisis se realizó mediante modelos de regresión por mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. No se encontró evidencia que relacione el tamaño de la junta directiva y su independencia con el valor de la empresa. Estos resultados pueden explicarse por las características del mercado de capitales colombiano (relativamente pequeño e ilíquido), las débiles leyes de protección de los accionistas y la presencia de empresas familiares en la muestra. Se recomienda a las entidades de control, profundizar en esfuerzos para sensibilizar al mercado sobre los beneficios de la implementación de buenas prácticas de gobierno corporativo en las juntas directivas.
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