Performance characteristics of bidders in auctions of discrete time (discrete clock auctions) through risk aversion
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18041/2619-4244/dl.14-15.3138Keywords:
Income, Price, Average, AuctionAbstract
The main result is the similarity of the result with those obtained by static Peter Cramton (2011) dynamic auction auctions. The only difference relate to the income generated in the static auctions held. The auction of second-price sealed envelope generated more income to the auctioneer to auction first-price sealed envelope. This result is due to the huge difference assigned randomly, in valuations between an auction and a corresponding lower values for auctions A than B. The average valution in the auction is about 30.600, higher than average B auction is about 75.800. An experimental desing where all participant were exposed to tow levels of the inpedent variable wa used: first, we proceeded to make the auction of first-price sealed envelope, then the auction of second-price sealed envelope was performed.
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