

**ORIGINAL**  
**Research article**

## **The cross-border migratory situation in Norte de Santander, binational challenges\***

**Situación migratoria transfronteriza en Norte de Santander, desafíos binacionales**

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### **Abstract**

The study's objective is to analyze the challenges and opportunities of the Colombo-Venezuelan migration on the border of the Norte de Santander department between 2015 and 2017. It is based on various information with the use of study sources, applying a bibliographic review methodology. This article considers a challenge in search of improvement in the social policy and commercial economy of Colombia and Venezuela taking advantage of the exchange opportunities presented by the demographic situation present in these two countries. The objectives generated satisfaction and well-being in the migrant population, identifying particular experiences in the border area in an exploration of strategic alternatives for economic and social development.

**Keywords:** Cross-Border Migration, Border, Colombo Venezuelan, Border Crossings

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## Resumen

El objetivo de estudio es el análisis de los desafíos y oportunidades de la migración Colombo – venezolana en la frontera del departamento Norte de Santander entre 2015 y 2017. Se basa en diversa información con la utilización de fuentes de estudio, aplicando una metodología de revisión bibliográfica. Este artículo considera un reto en busca la mejora en la política social y la economía comercial de Colombia y Venezuela aprovechando las oportunidades cambiarias presentadas ante la situación demográfica presente en estos dos países. Los objetivos generaron satisfacción y bienestar en la población migrante identificando experiencias particulares generadas en la zona de frontera en exploración de unas alternativas estratégicas para el desarrollo económico y social.

**Palabras Clave:** Migración Transfronteriza, Frontera, Colombo Venezolana, Pasos Fronterizos

## SUMMARY

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## Introduction

This article seeks to analyze and propose contingency plans for the context that has arisen in the Colombian-Venezuelan border between 2015 and 2017, specifically in the northern department of Santander, generating uncertain situations in political, economic, social, and cultural aspects reflecting violent changes forged by governments and their ideologies need to generate diverse alternatives with real solutions by the academy for the support of institutional demands in order to help the nortesantandereana region; and thus contribute in the situation caused by migrants who opt for the willingness to move through bordering lands (Riaño-Garzón, Raynaud-Prado, Albornoz-Arias, Mazuera-Arias 2018). Many are undecided about their destination, and others with the option of settling in Cúcuta and metropolitan areas for the exploration of economic opportunities, improving their quality of life, products of the basic basket, medicines, or to improve their personal and family situation, counteracting the economic, social and political reality experienced in the neighboring country Venezuela.

Therefore, the Colombia-Venezuela binational situation study constitutes a comparative analysis with other countries in the world which experience the transit of migrants in search of food security, risking their integrity and life (Tapia-Ladino, 2012). The search for the main causes that generate human mobility of Venezuelans by land through the main border crossings between Venezuela and Colombia; Venezuela and Brazil; Venezuela and Guyana, delimiting the study geographically in one of the most particular borders in the world; Also one of the most dynamic borders, with more similarities than differences, with more movement of people, goods, currency and many economic activities that converge in this border area between Venezuela and Colombia, as is the land border between the State of Tachira (Venezuela) and the Department of Norte de Santander (Colombia).

The phenomenon of migration has multiple dimensions for people who aim to improve their quality of life, but this leaves a deep trace among communities and families, representing major changes in population dynamics of demographic, economic, social, and family type (Tamayo-

Medina & Canal-Pérez, 2019). To increase household income through remittances, migration has become a good alternative, taking advantage of the exchange rate differential and sending money to their countries of origin to people who stayed there. Demographic changes within communities, whether in the country from which they migrate or in the country of transit or final destination, represent a challenge for governments.

Implementing cooperation schemes counteracts unexpected migratory phenomena such as the one currently represented, which do not act individually. However, in combination: The existence of common cultural values (Drovack & Nie, 1997) is a determining factor in the communities, and the existence of economic networks forms exchanges of information for developing technical and administrative knowledge necessary in the commercial processes. The competitive advantage of goods generated from one region to another is recognized depending on the type of cooperation.

For 2016, the socioeconomic dynamics between the two sister countries along this border were identified as the four border crossings enabled and legally constituted by the governments of Venezuela and Colombia. Only three of these border crossings were operational, and one was completely closed due to political orders and decisions of the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Spíndola-Zago, 2016). For each of the three land border crossings partially operational for the period mentioned above, the human mobility crossing was enabled, where several particular activities occurred daily, which can only be evidenced in a border like the one in the case study. For this reason, it is worth analyzing each of the migratory situations that were generated in this geographical boundary in the space of time delimited between the years 2015-2017, given that, in August 2015, due to political decisions of the Venezuelan government, a total closure of the Colombian-Venezuelan border was generated (Albornoz-Arias, Mazuera-Arias, Millán-Vázquez-de-la-Torre & Briceño-León, 2019); total closure that lasted for three months, but that as of June 2022 continues in a state of partial closure and there is no indication of any option on the part of the government to reestablish normality between the border areas.

This article shows the alternatives to reduce the border closure, a problem affecting the region, Colombia and Venezuela, and mainly Venezuelan migrants heading to Colombia, crossing the northern border of Santander. The study's objective is to analyze migration challenges on the border between Colombia and Venezuela in the northern department of Santander between 2015 and 2017. Based on diverse information using study sources, you are applying a literature review methodology such as books, scientific articles, and newspapers (Rodríguez de los Ríos, Huairé-Inacio & Lujano-Vilchis, 2014).

## **Resolution scheme**

### **1. Research problem**

What are the main challenges and opportunities generated by the Cross-Border Migration situation in the Norte Santander Department of Colombia between 2015 and 2017? Resolution scheme?

### **2. Methodology**

This article responds to qualitative research (Sale, 2022), which studied the context and nature of the migratory phenomenon through documents showing border dynamics to interpret

the Colombian-Venezuelan reality, conflicts, and human phenomena. The research corresponded to a study of interpretative comprehension scope. According to Cárcamo (2005), interpretative comprehension is a hermeneutic process that exposes the human experience to the context that defines it, exposed in a scientific language based on a presented problem. The introduction of values in social research took into account the values of the subjects participating in the social situation under study and the researcher's values (Crocetta, Carpita & Perchinunno, 2022). Likewise, the study was exploratory in scope, given that it sought to explain subjects and areas from new horizons (Hernandez-Sampieri, Fernández-Collado & Baptista, (2014).

To identify the main causes that generated migrations in the northern department of Santander between 2015 and 2017 (Cancillería de Colombia, 2021); the phenomenon presented by migrations from the neighboring country Venezuela was answered by consulting newspapers and magazines. Likewise, the dynamics of the migratory movement of the border were identified (Pavletic-Favi & Reyes-Martínez, 2014). Also, the best practices used according to the area's current position were determined to mitigate the problems presented in the economic, social, cultural, and environmental aspects.

### **3. Drafting plan**

#### **3.1 Historical context of the Colombian-Venezuelan border region in Norte de Santander, Táchira**

Of all the bordering countries, Venezuela and Colombia have a similar history; post-independence clashes between the influential parts of Gran Colombia, Bogotá, and Caracas led to their dissidence in the 19th century (Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The geographic space and political disparities between leaders of Santa Fe de Bogotá and the regional power in Venezuela caused tensions between the two countries, which followed the separation of Gran Colombia and led to the first debates over the division of the borders of the two nations.

The first division of the border began through the Pombo-Michelena Treaty in 1833, which failed to be effective because of the rejection of the Venezuelan Congress, and these problems caused the need to seek judgments abroad (Cárdenas-Solano & Muñoz-Fonseca, 2018). In 1881 the first transformation occurred, reaching the Award in the Boundary Question between Colombia and Venezuela in 1891(Puente & Rodríguez, 2020). Other limits were resolved through the Arbitral Award of the Swiss Federal Council in 1922 and concluded in 1941 through the Treaty on Demarcation of Borders and Navigation of the Common Rivers with Venezuela, commonly known as the López de Mesa - Gil Borges Treaty (López de Mesa - Gil Borges Treaty).

Despite the political problems, both nations maintain fundamental cultural, social, and commercial links. Compared to other border areas, where the links between the countries are smaller, the border area with Venezuela, specifically in the nortesantandereanos department, has historically not only been the most operative of Colombia but possibly of the entire South American continent, with a latent binational people despite the crises and termination of relations throughout historical economic stages to in the last 80 years (Galeano-David, Badillo & Rodríguez, 2019). The Venezuelan country is the main recipient of Colombian migrants for economic issues related to the conflict, which is why the border area is fundamental to the development and effects of the armed conflict in the Colombian nation.

Displacement to Venezuela has been constant throughout history, specifically at the beginning of the 20th century, during the violence and hostile economic situations in the departments of Santander, Norte de Santander, and Boyacá, driving a large number of Colombians to migrate to Venezuela, and other events, such as what happened on April 9, 1948 (Ramírez & Ospina, 2021). Migration between the two countries has been mostly of Colombians heading to Venezuela in the last 50 years, mainly due to the boom of the Venezuelan economy since the 1970s, but especially in the early 2000s as a consequence of the intensification of the internal conflict and violence by different Colombian armed forces.

### **3.2 Colombian-Venezuelan border region in Norte de Santander, Táchira in the XXI century**

The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) promotes integration between border areas. In the operation of a Border Integration Zone (from now on ZIF) in 2001, a project was concluded to deepen relations in the border zones. However, in practice, these international tools have yet to be favorable. The ZIF, and its magnitude in the border territory between the State of Táchira, Venezuela, and the Department of Norte de Santander, Colombia (Arciniegas-Serna, 2018), has been secondary in the natural integration of the zones for social and economic causes (Palacios-Escobar, 2013). The transformation of Venezuelan political aspects has directly impacted the binational structure of the border zones; for example, Venezuela's retirement from the Andean Community caused the predicted border integration to not serve as an area of cooperation.

In local aspects, except the city of Cúcuta and nearby municipalities, the border zone is characterized by little Colombian institutional presence, as opposed to greater control in the Venezuelan country with participation in the territory (Contreras-Velásquez, Wilches-Duran, Delgado-Rangel & Cerda-Carrasco, 2016), both by military entities and the civilian community. Similar to other border areas, the low presence of institutions causes low levels in aspects related to development and respect for the rights of the inhabitants in the face of the control of criminal groups.

The border area under study is in the state of Táchira, in southwestern Venezuela and northeastern Colombia: it comprises the state of Tachira and the northeastern department of Santander in both countries. It has approximately 32,748 km<sup>2</sup> and was inhabited by 2,783,980 people in 2015. The territorial extension of Colombia and Venezuela is 2,260 km, of which about 150 km is the international boundary, representing about 6.70% of the extension (Migration of Colombia, 2017). In short, the territory is small geographically, with a large population. It is known as the border area with the largest population between both countries, caused by the historical relationship derived from the articulation fulfilled during the consolidation of both countries. The aforementioned corroborates that this study is limited to an inhabited area with an ancestral relationship of little conflict.

The crisis being experienced socially in Venezuela is the effect of a deteriorated economic process, covered up by the current leaders under the excuse of an "economic conflict" but presented by foreign entities and entities of the country that perceive the deepening in the index of shortages, poverty and lack of purchasing power in Venezuela, causing an alarming population crisis. At the beginning of 2018, the crisis increased, reflecting a discordant reality, referring to the need to examine multilateral organizations and their objectives to end the year.

According to the World Economic Outlook report by The World Bank (2022), it was appreciated that in 2018 the Venezuelan economy registered a reduction of 4.20%. The report

stated that for the year 2017, in this country, there was an economic recession equivalent to 11.90% and it was higher than what was in mind, according to the study, contrary to the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean which had an increase of 0.90%, after 2 years of reduction. Argentina and Colombia reflected an increase of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of almost 3.00%, and Venezuela had a depression of -14.50%. The World Bank emphasized that between 1990 and 1998, Venezuela's economy grew annually by 3.40%. After 1998, the change of the political regime caused that in the last 20 years, it only increased by 1.20%; this generated the development of the population's purchasing power, not because of economic variations, but because of the growth of oil revenues that reached over \$98.64 by the end of the 90's to \$140.08 in its maximum price in 2008.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that the social and economic crisis in the Venezuelan country has increased since 2014 due to the collapse of oil exports and production. The IMF considered in the Global Economic Prospects report that inflation in Venezuela would reach around 14.00%, placing it as the nation with the highest inflation compared to the rest of the countries in the world. In the same way, Venezuela's GDP decreased from 15.00% to 6.00% for the year 2019, causing the largest drop of the last years in America (International Monetary Fund, 2021), referring to the low revision compared to the drops predicted in the World Economic Outlook of October 2017 (-0.90% to -0.40%). The report pointed out that if these forecasts are confirmed, the Venezuelan economy will experience a decrease of more than \$50 in the last years.

Rosati (2018) expressed that by the end of 2017, Venezuela would obtain the first position of the most miserable economy worldwide for the fourth time. This reference follows studies carried out by the entity combining different positions of unemployment and inflation. Likewise, Rosati (2018) emphasized that despite the calculation of Venezuelan inflation being similar to other data, it is complicated by the resistance of the country's leaders to express official figures; instruments have originated as an allusion to the increase of products commonly consumed in different establishments for a specific time.

In the face of the intensification of economic problems, its social effect was accompanied by alarming humanitarian problems. Considering the National Survey of Living Conditions, ENCOVI (2018), in Venezuela, poverty increased from almost 49.00% in 2014 to 87.00% by 2017, yielding that 61.20% of inhabitants lived in extreme poverty. Additionally, the survey argued that in hyperinflation such as the one Venezuela is experiencing, households are under unreachable poverty limits. Regarding unemployment figures, the National Survey of Living Conditions (2018) pointed out that 7.50% to 9.00% of people possess salary limitations compared to the exaggerated prices of products. Unemployment is related to the closure of more than 500,000 organizations in almost 10 years, data revealed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2018), highlighting that currently, in Venezuela, only 250,000 companies operate compared to the companies operating in 2002.

Hausman (2018) designated that the current adverse situation to the social and economic penetrated the problems happening, going from catastrophic to unthinkable, where what is most striking is the minimum wage (which in this country the average employee gets), adjusted to the lowest current calories consumed per family nucleus, decreasing from 52,825 calories consumed per day in 2012 to only 7,005 daily calories consumed for the year 2017, being deficient to sustain a complete family. Therefore, as a sequel to the social breakdown, the Venezuelan people, in order to counteract the consequences of the economic problems, changed their eating habits, doubled their working hours, and migrated to other countries

looking for new opportunities to manage to survive (Bermúdez, Mazuera-Arias, Albornoz-Arias, & Morffe-Peraza 2018).

### **3.3 Migratory trends of Venezuelan citizens**

Examining migration from the Venezuelan border closure, the phenomenon in South America increased by 895.00% between 2015 and 2017. In exact figures, in these years, around 924,547 Venezuelans emigrated (Wetzler, Marchesini, Villegas & Canavati, 2022), which in the last 13 years, add up to 1,622,000 people worldwide, of which 1,552,407 are from fifteen different countries (three European countries) and 885,891 from South American countries. According to the report by the International Office of Migration (2020), in the two most recent years, most Venezuelans have migrated to the neighboring country Colombia or have used this nation to reach other countries. Other destinations are the United States and Spain, which have registered higher numbers of Venezuelans than the rest of the world.

There needs to be precise data on Venezuelan migration, given that many people have two nationalities or have acquired the nationality of the country that has received them. The National Survey of Living Conditions (2017) reflected that 8.00% of Venezuelan families had a family member who had emigrated from the country in recent years. The National Survey of Living Conditions (2017) reported that, on average, there are 1.3 migrants per family, noting that between 2012 and 2017, about 815,000 inhabitants migrated to other countries; likewise, the United Nations (UN) estimated for 2015, a displacement of Venezuelans exceeding one million inhabitants.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the ENCOVI, 2017, Venezuelan migration was between 4.70% and 5.40%. Likewise, the IOM located that by 2015 Venezuelan migrants living abroad were 697,562, representing almost 2.30% of the Venezuelan population (National Survey of Living Conditions, 2018). when comparing data from 2015 with 2017, an explosion in the displacement of Venezuelans to other nations is corroborated, which reached approximately 4 million migrants (between 10.00% and 12.00% of the Venezuelan population). As expressed in Figure 1, these estimates are based on surveys of Venezuelan inhabitants (Reyes, 2018).

## **4. Research Results**

### **4.1 Causes of Migrations in the Norte de Santander Region Between 2015 and 2017**

In the Norte de Santander region, the main problem was reflected in one of the greatest challenges faced by Colombia and other countries in the Americas: regulating Venezuelan migration to guarantee the fundamental rights of a citizen is attributed to the challenge Colombia faced in developing efficient information channels in public and private entities to assist migrants (Romero, 2020).

For the year 2015, upon the declaration of the indefinite closure of the Colombian-Venezuelan border zone, dictated by President Maduro: about 22,000 inhabitants of Colombia were repatriated from the Venezuelan country, and other people residing in the country were forced to return to Colombia. The official entry by Venezuelan migrants with passports reached 378,965 in 2016 and, for 2017, reached 761,629 Venezuelans registered with the Border Mobility Card. From August to September 2017, 60,924 special permits to stay in the country of Colombia were generated for Venezuelan migrants (Migración Colombia, 2017).



Migration represented the different determinations of the Colombian authorities since 2016, when the displacement of migrants between border areas was reactivated and promoted; Colombian authorities suppressed certain tourist visa conditions, given the growing wave of illegal Venezuelan immigrants with unknown destinations. Most Venezuelan immigrants took refuge in eastern Colombia, primarily in Cúcuta, and progressively other cities in the country's interior, which produced some mishaps in the social, educational, and economic determinations in the cities receiving immigrants.

The causes of migration in Venezuela are determined by economic and social problems generated by the closing of the border and the multiple sanctions established in the exploitation and commercialization of oil, which is the main activity for generating wealth in the country. Through different policies that guarantee human rights and the adoption of new citizens in Latin America, the welfare of Venezuelan migrants in search of a dignified reception and job opportunities leads this population to settle in different countries with a better quality of life.

**Figure 1. Migration trends in destinations with more Venezuelan migrants**



**Source:** Taken from Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (2020). <https://www.iom.int/es/countries/venezuela>

#### **4.2 Actions, Strategies, Contingency Plans, and Actions Carried Out by the Supporting Entities in Migrations in the Norte de Santander Region Between 2015 to 2017**

An analysis of two components was carried out regarding the diagnosis of the actions taken by the regulatory and support entities in the migrations of the Norte de Santander Department between 2015 and 2017. The first was a characterization of the economic model proposed from the main axes of the government plans for each country and their definition of the economic model. The second involves identifying the regulatory and support entities in the migration issue in Norte de Santander and their contribution to actions taken to mitigate the migration problem between 2015 and 2017.

Since the end of the 20th century, Colombia has been at an economic disadvantage concerning Venezuela. International oil prices showed a favorable outlook for Venezuela,



while Colombia, by the same time, was experiencing a failed PEACE litigation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which at the beginning of the 21st century, intensified the armed conflict in Colombia (Cárdenas-Solano & Muñoz-Fonseca, 2018). In this context, Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías came to power, on the Venezuelan side and on the Colombian side Álvaro Uribe Vélez a few years later.

The great difference between Colombia and Venezuela was marked by two issues, which would be the route of differences in the coming years; on the one hand, the vision of the State and its participation in the economy, and on the other hand, the vision on the lawsuits and consequences of the armed war in Colombia (Ayala, 2015). These differences were characterized by the great influence the Venezuelan government began to have in the different economic areas, thanks to the wealth generated by oil at the beginning of the 21st century. This situation allowed the Venezuelan government to fulfill the social, economic, and cultural agenda.

In economic matters, the freedom of private property in Venezuela began to suffer due to government regulations. Censorship began to make the news, while, in Colombia, several scandals arose from some members of the State for making direct and indirect alliances against illegal groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Patriotic National Liberation Forces (FPLN) and the "Tenth Martin Villa Front," a dissident group formed from the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Patriotic Forces of National Liberation (FPLN) and the "Tenth Martin Villa Front," a dissident group formed after the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which fueled the violence in the Department of Norte de Santander (Riaño-Garzón et al., 2018). The growth of guerrillas in Catatumbo activated the emergence of illegal army groups called "paramilitary groups" from Urabá and Antioquia, increasing internal displacement to Venezuela. In that first decade, Venezuela became a destination for Colombians, and Chavismo's policy of dual nationality facilitated the rights of Colombians in Venezuela.

However, this Venezuelan government assistance began to diminish, provoked by the decrease in the price of oil and the rigid exchange control, which began to be extended to different operations of inflows and outflows of foreign currency. The missions (social programs of the Venezuelan government) (Torres-García, Mogrovejo-Andrade & Panizo-Cardona, 2021) began to reach their ceiling, causing social and economic distortions in the most vulnerable population. The beginning of the nationalization of the companies went hand in hand with their low productivity, giving rise to the so-called "desabastecimiento" (shortages). Hence, the Chávez government accelerated the participation of the State in all areas of the Venezuelan economy to curb phenomena such as high inflation, unemployment, and the decrease in international trade relations.

While this was happening in Venezuela, in Colombia, under the mandate of President Juan Manuel Santos, the PAZ inquiry with the FARC was initiated as a strategy to achieve a more equitable and educated country (Galeano David et al., 2019). In economic matters, although Colombia did not have a strong economy at the global level, in macroeconomic aspects, it had a stable economy that guaranteed investments, consumption, and savings. Hence, the Colombian government's commitment to economic freedoms, such as private property, foreign investment, and increased tourism, among others, marked the difference with Venezuela. In the second decade of the 21st century, Venezuelans began to notice the differences with Colombia in aspects such as quality of life, health, food, purchasing power, and formal employment. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency proposed to the city of Cúcuta that:

Mainly people should be incorporated into society in education, work, health system, and rights. The standards followed for this type of population, such as Syrians arriving in Turkey, is to make them feel at home (The UN Refugee Agency, 2016, p.214).

For example, the Ombudsman's Office designed a policy to avoid a humanitarian crisis at the border, such as the Special Permit to Stay (PEP) and the new Border Mobility Card (TMF), which sought to guarantee Venezuelans greater access to health, justice, and education services. It should be noted that some Colombians residing in Venezuela and who returned to the country regained access to basic services, given their dual nationality status. The Colombian Government also contributed financial resources to guarantee medical services to Venezuelans at the "Erasmus Meoz" University Hospital in the city of Cúcuta, which during this period collapsed due to the increase in the provision of services to Venezuelan citizens. Another entity that played a leading role was the International Organization for Migration, IOM (2020), which provided the most support and adjustments to shelters and financing for productive projects in Norte de Santander (cocoa and coffee). In addition, other entities supported Venezuelan residents located in the Municipality of Villa del Rosario (Table 2).

**Table 2. Collaborative entity and the model of action taken on Venezuelan migration between 2015 to 2017**

ENTITY OR SUPPORT STAFF	MODELS OF COLLABORATIONS	EFFECT
Ministry - Foreign Affairs	Collaborate on the issue of border mobility in order to ensure that all Venezuelan personnel obtain this document.	Control of the Venezuelan population to gain access to health benefits, food, educational training, Etc.
San José de Cúcuta Police	Joint assistance with the capital of Colombia and the city of Bucaramanga for humanitarian aid work with relief entities such as the Special Operations Unit for Emergencies and Disasters (POLNASAR), prioritizing early childhood, adolescents, and young people.	Organize the entry of foreigners and help Colombian and Venezuelan residents by providing secure services.
Ministry of Health and Social Protection	Humanitarian support project in hospital centers.	Completely diminish the contagion of epidemics that affect the population.
Government of Norte de Santander	Endorse the support and backing of donations to affected personnel.	Organization of the essential elements that satisfy the needs of the Venezuelan people.
San José de Cúcuta Mayor's Office	Relief in the lodgings located in the municipal and local schools for migrants.	
Mayor's Office of Villa del Rosario	Relief in the lodgings located in the territory of the stop and medical.	
The Colombian Ombudsman's Office	Certifies the human rights of migrants by accompanying them to shelters and human movement centers.	Effectively facilitate the legal entry of foreigners into Colombia.
The National Society of the Colombian Red Cross	Civic support and soda fountain at the Simon Bolivar Bridge for deported immigrants, with primary participation in first aid attention.	First-hand humanitarian support.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Directing the coordination of the shelters and controlling the procedures of the affectations of foreigners.	Moderation of the danger faced by immigrants.
National Unit for Disaster Risk	Cooperation in the administrative part of the Municipalities and the State in order to guarantee food	Support for the humanization of new

ENTITY OR SUPPORT STAFF	MODELS OF COLLABORATIONS	EFFECT
Management	to the people with multiple affectations.	residents in the territory.
Scalabrini Migration Headquarters	Provision of shelter, food, legal consultancy, services of interest to the people, welfare, and health, among others.	Temporary coverage of basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, first aid, housing, legal services, routes, legalization in Colombia, and job placement.
Civic Security	Collaborate with donations and benefits.	
Emergency and Urgent Care Regulatory Center	Cooperate in the aid of the most needy as a leader of excellent and positive operations to supply the urgent needs of immigrants.	
Norwegian Refugee Council	Participate in the humanitarian aid table with donations and delivery logistics.	
Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS)	Provides support in lodging, food, legal advice, care routes, health, and security, among others.	
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)		

**Source:** own elaboration.

In this order of ideas, the migration regime was built voluntarily, employing instruments that facilitated the free movement of people in the territory. In this way, the rights to resume the civic development of the foreign people are evidenced. Therefore, the government of Colombia encouraged the enactment of political regulations for the protection of the migrant with fixed or temporary domicile abroad (Organization of American States, 2018) in order to enforce their determination not to return to their country of origin. For example, Bill 148 of 2017 Article 3 of the Colombian House of Representatives possesses the following intentions:

To progress and evolve in the human rights and duties of migrants, Colombian population, and foreigners living in Colombia. Regularize, expand, and protect government services and opportunities for the Colombian population in other countries and consulates. Increasing the strengthening of the tools and transformations of the laws of the Colombian regime for the country to develop in conjunction with the various models structured for Colombian people abroad.

As another strategy to dynamize migration control alternatives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migration Colombia conceived the Special Permit to Stay (PEP) in order to normalize the migration of approximately 230,000 Venezuelans (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, 2021) and allow them to work legally, contribute to the health and pension systems. Likewise, the Border Mobility Card (TMF) was established, which evidenced the entry and exit of approximately 588,000 Venezuelans; however, this regulated migration motivated the exit the same from the Colombian territory (Migración Colombia, 2017), which caused the request for 47,300 visas, of which, 20.00% were residence visas. In this way, the Colombian Government sought to reduce informality and illegal entry into the country, which for 2017 was approximately 150,000 Venezuelans.

With this in mind, the Foreign Ministry worked hard before the problem worsened. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, María Ángela Holguín, implemented the Borders for Prosperity Plan 2010-2018, through which she drastically changed the economic estimation of the diplomat toward social investment in the border territory. This ministry managed the construction of approximately 25 schools, provided telemedicine plans on the border, and contributed USD 500,000,000 to productive projects.

Colombia, in its past was a territory that produced migrants and also has a historical debt with Venezuela since about one million Colombians live there. Therefore, the Colombian government presented various proposals to respond to the situation in Venezuela, so much so that Venezuelans reported having been beneficiaries of installation and shelter assistance, between August and November 2015 (Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres, 2016). Colombia also provided humanitarian assistance through Law 1565 of 2012; therefore, in Cúcuta, the Erasmo Meoz University Hospital provided emergency care to migrant families, the National Civil Registry Office relaxed the apostille requirements and the Ombudsman's Office maintained constant monitoring of the area in order to provide legal guidance and address protection cases.

The Ministry of National Education supported school restaurants in some neighborhoods. However, this initiative was reduced by 50.00% in 2017, given that this program does not receive undocumented Venezuelan children (Decree 2016 of March 01, 2021). Also, the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) generated support for children with the Family, Women, and Childhood Community Homes Plan. However, this plan did not apply to undocumented Venezuelan families. The Department for Social Prosperity (DPS) supported temporary jobs in 2015. Metrovivienda Cúcuta and the Municipal Planning Secretariat regulated human settlements, for example, that of Crispín Durán in commune 7, where 600 families benefited and allocated twenty-four plots for the relocation program (Mojica-Acevedo et al., 2020). In some sectors of Cúcuta, such as Camilo Daza, the municipal administration introduced gas and sewage pipes.

International cooperation took place with the UN Agency for Refugees (UNHCR) with the Local Integration and Conflict Resolution projects, for example, the intervention in the Scalabrini community, assisting some families with markets, training young people in recreational activities and training women in the use of sewing machines. According to Romero (2020), the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) attended to some humanitarian needs in the sector such as: 20 health supports, 164 school kits, food vouchers, assistance and legal routing for access to rights for families in the sector. Similarly, JRS provided psychosocial care to refugees to cope with the emotional impact of violent events and accompanied mixed families returning to the country, within the framework of Law 1565, which provided one-time transportation support to Colombian citizens who left aside families composed of mothers and children of Venezuelan nationality. It is then where the following practices stand out as viable practices for the mitigation of the problems generated by the closing of the border and the migration generated by the political, economic and commercial situation in Venezuela, aid services of different international entities that operate under the framework of the law established by the different nations that receive this population, support and attention to basic needs to guarantee human rights and the improvement of living conditions.

## Conclusions

The phenomenon of migration between the Colombia-Venezuela was analyzed that the departure of people struggling for better welfare for the whole family has generated some (Bermudez et al., 2018) historical and traditional ties in the culture that unites the economic and social aspects of these two countries that have transcended with several variables and situations that have created a disproportionate effect in recent years these variables and encompass political, social and humanitarian aspects that affect the economic and commercial dynamics.

The conjunctures related to the actions presented above have perpetrated by the Venezuelan administration a gap that marks an exchange rate regime that has generated an economic and social gap that has ended with the production and industry in Venezuela (Albornoz-Arias et al., 2019); the crisis presented in this article represents a labor problem that is triggered by the migratory crisis, which has represented in individuals and family nuclei decisions for taking new opportunities influenced by the search for wealth, generating a chain reaction through various factors that have allowed that have generated the slowdown in economic progress, welfare, and living conditions.

The effect generated by the closing of borders and the migration of Venezuelans have forged political decisions that affect territorial populations located in the Colombian-Venezuelan border customs, trade relations, and other variables such as ideology, are breaking the stability, decisions by family unit and support the decisions formulated in government plans, generating. As a result, distrust in citizens and insufficient social security have weakened institutions and are represented in a lack of social investment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, 2018). The increase in the price of goods and services forms protectionist policies. It develops xenophobia among the inhabitants of neighboring countries, which does not allow sensitive decision-making in the face of the imbalances and the rescission presented in the Venezuelan economy and in the socio-cultural aspects, originating ruptures and disagreements in these cross-border regions.

This article considers a challenge in search of improvement in the country's social policy and commercial economy, taking advantage of the exchange opportunities presented by the demographic situation present in these two countries. The objectives generated satisfaction in the documentary review, where particular experiences generated in the border zone in exploring strategic economic and social development alternatives are exposed.

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